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‘Graveyard of Empires’: Geopolitics, war, and the 
tragedy of Afghanistan 
James Fergusson and R. Gerald Hughes 
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When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains 
And the women come out to cut up what remains, 
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains  
An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier. 
Rudyard Kipling, ‘The Young British Soldier’, 18921 
 
Financially it is ruinous. Morally it is wicked.  Militarily it is an open question, and 
politically it is a blunder. 




To those who favour a literary flourish in their historiography, Afghanistan has long been 
known as the ‘graveyard of empires’.3 This reputation has quite some lineage given the long 
history of great power engagement with the strategically-located Afghanistan (in 2011 the 
British Museum in London ran an exhibition treasures entitled ‘Afghanistan: Crossroads of the 
Ancient World’).4 It is undoubtedly a difficult territory over which to establish control, and its 
reputation induces pessimism in observers at the merest sign of trouble. Mythologies abound 
and those seeking to invoke ‘lessons of history’, enthusiastically relate stories of British and 
Soviet military disasters in the face of the hardy Afghan populace, forged into steeliness by 
centuries of struggle (rivalled only by warrior-nations like the Chechens or the Vietnamese). 
Dominant traditional narratives posit that Afghanistan has long been at the centre of the nexus 
comprising international politics, the Great Powers and Islam. And, indeed, Great Power 
interest in that state does seem to have a long history. After his defeat at the hands of the 
Afghans in 330 BC, Alexander the Great is said to have remarked that ‘Afghanistan is easy to 
march into but hard to march out of.’ Over a millennium later, a similarly frustrating experience 
was endured by the fearsome Genghis Khan in 1220.5 That two of the greatest warrior princes 
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in history suffered such indignities is something that commentators have long favoured as an 
opening line in innumerable pieces of literary armchair strategy. (And, over the centuries, the 
myth of Afghan invincibility was reinforced as the greatest powers of their day – the 
Macedonians, the Mongols, the Mughals, the British, the Soviet Union and, most recently, the 
United States - found their might rendered impotent). In 2001 Milton Breaden asserted that ‘If 
anyone is to replace an emir in Afghanistan, it will have to be the people of Afghanistan 
themselves. Any doubters should ask the British and the Russians.’6 More recently, Jonathan 
Steele reflected on the two most recent invaders thus: ‘When I look back now at the reports 
and analyses I wrote at the time, it’s impossible not to be struck by the similarity of Soviet 
policy to what the Bush and Obama administrations have been trying to achieve with their 
more recent interventions.’7 That said, when writing about Afghanistan, in either the specific 
or the generality, it is important for scholars and commentators to interrogate what they might 
regard of omnipresent. Kaushik Roy is thus quite right when he notes that ‘Islam in general 
and jihad in particular are not always crucial components of Afghan opposition to external 
invaders in their homelands’.8 
 
As with so many other interventions, the British invasion of 1839 was prompted by Great 
Power (in)security concerns. (In the spring of 1839, as the British invaded Afghanistan for the 
first time, some 20,000 British and East India Company troops poured through the high 
mountain passes and re-establishing Shah Shuja ul-Mulk on the throne). The Emir, Dost 
Mohammad, wary of his attempts to play the British off against his neighbours to the north, 
the Russians. Dost Mohammad was duly exiled to British India and replaced by his 
predecessor, Shah Shuja (who grew increasingly isolated and repressive means until he was 
assassinated in 1842.9 The British experienced a disaster during their retreat at the end of this 
First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842).  During their passage over the mountain passes outside 
Kabul 4,500 British soldiers and 12,500 civilians died.  This colossal humiliation inflicted 
upon the then global hegemon, was memorably captured by Elizabeth Butler in her painting 
depicting Dr William Brydon - the sole survivor - reaching the British fort in Jalalabad on 
horseback. For many commentators, the savagery of the nature of insurgency in Afghanistan 
in the nineteenth century would have been only too familiar to their twenty-first century 
successors in the British army. In 2006 General David Richards, the British commander of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),10 stated that his forces engaged in the most 
‘persistent, low-level dirty fighting’ undertaken by the British since the Korean War (1950-
1953). Confirming this, a professor at the Royal Statistical Society declared that British soldiers 
in Afghanistan were precisely six times more likely to be killed than their comrades in Iraq.11 
Of course, geography is the one constant in international politics and, here at least, 
Afghanistan’s terrain makes it a difficult nut to crack. As an official British parliamentary 
research paper noted in 1997: ‘Afghanistan to the south and east of the Hindu Kush straddles 
an historic migration and invasion route between Central and South Asia. The mountains form 
a distinct physical barrier and the small number of passes have generally been easier to defend 
militarily than to capture’.12 In such a vein, William Dalrymple recently identified certain 
parallels between contemporary Afghanistan and the war of 1839-1842: unresolved tribal 
rivalries; strikingly similar battles in familiar locations; garrisons of foreigners under threat in 
the same geographical hotspots. In one particularly resonant move in 1835, the then Emir of 
Afghanistan (Dost Mohammad Khan) called for jihad against the invaders – beginning with 
the Sikhs who were then in occupation of the provinces of Kandahar and Peshawar.13 
 
In April 1978, the Afghan army, forcibly established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 
executed the ruling family, and installed the PDPA’s14 Secretary General Nur Muhammad 
Taraki as President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.15 Ten months later, a 
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serious diplomatic crisis occurred when the US to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped 
and murdered by persons unknown. (These were variously identified as leftists (specifically, 
the Marxist Settam-e-Melli (‘National Oppression’), and as Islamists.16 Dubs was killed in a 
failed rescue attempt by government forces and this further soured US-Soviet relations 
generally and over Afghanistan in particular just as the era of détente was slowly ending and 
political Islam was rising. Documents released long after the fall of the Soviet Union reveal 
how politicised intelligence from Afghanistan severely curtailed Moscow’s policy choices in 
that country17 (in a manner that one might, once again, invoke a comparison with the case of 
the US intervention in Vietnam). Of course, the fall of the Shah, a staunch ally of the West, 
and the creation of the hostile theocracy that is the Islamic Republic of Iran, stimulated fears 
that the US would intervene against the Mullahs. Moscow also believed that the US might seek 
to involve itself in Afghanistan in order to obtain a ‘substitute’ regional ally.18 Indeed, Cold 
War paranoia was such that the Soviet Union even fretted that Afghan strongman Hafizullah 
Amin was a CIA agent!19 (Something the US government was unaware of).20 This whole 
Soviet intervention once again demonstrated how the Great Powers – in this case in the Cold 
War – under-estimated the motivating power of Islam (and Moscow was to struggle to secure 
Afghanistan with an army of 104,000).21 Despite popular misconceptions, US involvement in 
Afghanistan actually preceded the Soviet invasion.22 Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy 
Carter’s hard-line National Security Adviser (1977-1981), stated at interview in 1998 that, 
while the Soviets army invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, President Carter signed 
the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on 3 July 
1979. ‘And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my 
opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.’ The staunch anti-
communist Brzezinski asserted that ‘We didn’t push the Russians to intervene [in Afghanistan], 
but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.’ Predictably, the Cold Warrior 
had few regrets about his role stoking conflict. 
 
That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the 
Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the 
Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now 
have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War. Indeed, for 
almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the 
government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the 
breakup of the Soviet empire.23 
 
While some historians24 support the notion that the US national security state was able to trick 
the Soviets into invading Afghanistan, others are more sceptical.25 John Ehrman noted in 
Studies in Intelligence, the CIA’s in-house journal, that ‘This is a claim … based on a remark 
made by Zbigniew Brzezinski in an interview 20 years after the fact [in 1998] and for which 
there appears to be no documentary or other substantiation. While anyone writing on Soviet 
intelligence needs to be aware of the reality of conspiracies and bizarre plots, this claim seems 
to go a little far.’26 Even then the debate may well be moot. In 1990 Artyom Borovik, a 
prominent Russian journalist and media magnate, perceptively opined that ‘Even if all the 
secret documents connected with the Soviet Union’s decision to invade Afghanistan were made 
public tomorrow, I doubt that they would shed much light on the truth; quite possibly they 
might just add to the confusion’.27 In Ghost Wars, Steve Coll downplayed the importance of 
the CIA operation in Afghanistan and cited declassified documents demonstrating  
Brzezinski’s fears about the Soviet invasion, ‘show[ing] no hint of satisfaction’ about the turn 
of events.28 (Although Brzezinski’s 1983 memoir gives the exact opposite impression).29 
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In 2012 Rodric Braithwaite, the last British ambassador the Soviet Union (1988-92), 30 
superbly charted the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan in his Afgansty. As the title states, he did 
this by focusing on the Afghansty – the word for Soviet veterans of the war. This highly original 
– and very human - volume deserves comparison with the very best writing on the experience 
of the American soldier in Vietnam. Braithwaite notes that, after a anniversary service at the 
Kremlin in 2009, that the veterans could at last feel that their sufferings were being recognised, 
‘even if the state for which they fought no longer existed.’31 
 
For the USSR in Afghanistan, as well as the USA in Iran, the period from 1978 is instructive 
in how both Superpowers tried to ignore the rise of political Islam whenever possible. In truth, 
in both Moscow and Washington, Islam was neither convenient in ideological terms nor a 
priority in policy terms. Documents now available indicate that the leadership of the USSR 
failed inasmuch as it relied excessively on pessimistic KGB assessments prior to deciding to 
invade in December 1979.32 During his tenure as British ambassador to Afghanistan, Sherard 
Cowper-Coles recalled that Zamir Kabulov, his Russian counterpart, often jokingly declared 
that his length of service there had caused a city to be named for him. As with many of his 
compatriots, he seemed ambiguous in his attitude as to whether, or not, he wanted the West to 
win, or lose, in Afghanistan. For although the latter course seemed to portend regional chaos 
and destabilisation, the idea that the West might be able to prevail where the mighty Red Army 
had failed. Small wonder that Kabulov would tell Cowper-Coles that ‘I have a very warm 
feeling towards you, [as] I see you making all the same mistakes as we did.’33 Braithwaite 
dissents from this view somewhat and avoids hackneyed comparisons with the past. In fact, for 
all the dramatic accidents of geography and history, there are number of distinctions between 
Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century and their Soviet and Western successor 
interventionists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Even so, Braithwaite asserts that ‘It 
took the Russians two hundred and fifty years to get to Kabul. The British started later, but got 
there sooner. Both were driven by the same imperial logic.’ This was articulated by the Russian 
Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov (1789–1883), in 1864. 
 
The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilised states which are 
brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed 
social organisation. In such cases it always happens that the more civilised 
state is forced, in the interests of the security of its frontiers and its 
commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whose 
turbulent and unsettled character makes them undesirable neighbours.34 
 
Braithwaite’s book addresses a number of myths about the Soviets’ war in Afghanistan. These 
include the notion that the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles supplied by the US led to Moscow’s 
decision to withdraw.35 When the Soviets reported their losses in war (between 1979 and 1989) 
as being relatively low, at 114 fixed-wing aircraft and 332 helicopters,36 it seems they were 
not lying. Indeed, the idea that the Soviets fought an unimaginative and inflexible 
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan37 is not sustainable. The myth that the war lead led to the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991 (a dissolution rooted in the history and the structures of the Soviet 
state) is also dispelled in Afgansty. Indeed, in 1979 Braithwaite himself wrote a briefing on the 
USSR for the incoming Thatcher government which stated ‘that the Soviet Union was a 
military giant but an economic and political pygmy.’ Alas, he notes, ‘my superiors regarded 
[this] as complacent so it was changed.’38 In time Braithwaite was proved right – as an official 
British report duly noted in 1997: ‘At that time [when the USSR invaded Afghanistan] the 
elderly Soviet leadership had no inkling of how close their economic and social system was to 
collapse and regarded the 1970s as a decade of successful global competition with the West in 
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general and the United States in particular.’39 And yet, in truth, and contrary to the boasts of 
individuals such as Osama bin Laden,40 the Red army was never defeated by the Mujahedeen 
(a ragtag of groups lacking equipment, discipline, cohesion and coordination). Indeed, some 
Afghan commanders who have faced both Soviet and US troops, rate the Soviets more highly. 
And the Soviet soldiers, often drawn from ordinary backgrounds themselves, are said generally 
to have got on better with the Afghans than their American counterparts. The civilian Soviet 
administration in Afghanistan can also be credited with a large building programme of schools, 
hospitals and housing (although, as with the USA in Vietnam, that hardly compensates for the 
brutality of the occupiers).41 Ultimately, it was estimated that 300,000 Soviet troops would be 
needed to pacify Afghanistan, entailing expenditure that was economically and politically 
impossible. Given this, even more than was the case with the US in Vietnam, the Soviet Union 
had little choice but to disengage.   
 
Despite the long history of foreign entanglements with Afghanistan, it remains a place that 
outsiders struggle to understand at first contact. For many correspondents, including one of the 
present authors, struggling to make sense of NATO’s campaign against the Taliban in southern 
Afghanistan from 2006, Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, published in 2004, was a kind of Bible. The 
principal justification of that war was that the Taliban had harboured Bin Laden, providing a 
sanctuary from which he organised the attacks of 9/11; and that this could happen again if the 
Taliban were not ‘disrupted, degraded and defeated,’ in the military parlance of the day. Yet 
the relationship between the Afghans and their Arab ‘guests’ was never so simple, and nor was 
America’s relationship with the jihadists. Coll’s Pulitzer Prize-winning thesis, now the 
accepted orthodoxy but not nearly so obvious at the time, was that the Islamist movement in 
Afghanistan-Pakistan was literally an American creation. Washington ideologues in the 
Reagan years, with assistance on the ground from the CIA, were so determined to win their 
proxy war against the Soviets that they ignored the risks of what they were fostering. Any 
enemy of our enemy is our friend, was their mantra: an ethically tangled policy whose legacy 
is still felt. The rise not just of the Taliban but Al Qaida, ISIS, the disasters of Iraq and Syria - 
all have their origins in the hot Afghan endgame of the Cold War. For authority and detail, 
nothing comes close to Coll’s study of how this happened. 
 
Directorate S is  Steve Coll’s sequel to Ghost Wars, and it is no less impressive. The former 
managing editor of the Washington Post, as well as that paper’s former South Asia bureau 
chief, Coll’s access on both Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon is astonishing, and he makes full 
use of it. He covers the ground with unusual thoroughness: he was assisted in this opus by no 
fewer than four full-time researchers. It is, for sure, an America-centric book. Reading its 
pages, it is easy sometimes to forget that the thirteen-year long Operation Enduring Freedom 
was a genuinely international enterprise, pulling in a coalition of 59 nations, many of whom 
paid a very high price for their participation in blood, treasure, and terrorist blowback in their 
homelands.42 But this is forgivable. The intervention was motivated by 9/11, and America led 
it and were the most heavily invested. It was always America that mattered most. As an expose 
of the workings of Washington, and the means by which Bush and then Obama reached their 
fateful decisions, Directorate S will likely never be beaten - and for a full understanding of 
how Britain and all the other allies were led into the Afghan mess, it is fundamental. 
 
The title of Steve Coll’s recent book – Directorate S - refers to the most secretive section of 
the ISI, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, which was responsible for relations with 
the Taliban. Coll shows how that paradoxical relationship lies at the heart of the failure of the 
US Afghan mission. On one hand, Pakistan was America’s most critical ally in the war, the 
territory by which NATO’s vast military machine in land-locked Afghanistan was resupplied. 
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They shared some security goals, too. Despite Bin Laden’s eventual location (and liquidation) 
on Pakistani soil, the ISI frequently co-operated with the CIA’s hunt for Al Qaida operatives. 
They had no love either for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a Taliban splinter group led 
by Baitullah Mehsud that emerged in 2007 in Waziristan in Pakistan’s lawless North West 
Frontier Province. The TTP’s fierce hostility to Islamabad was wholly different to that of their 
Afghan Talib parent organisation. Pakistan, however, also sees groups linked to Al Qaeda, such 
as TTP, as allies in its fight against India and as a way to exert influence against the US-backed 
government in Kabul.43 In 2009 the TTP briefly threatened the existence of the Pakistani state, 
fighting pitched battles with the Pakistan Army for control of Swat, a district just 80 miles from 
the capital. On the other hand, the Taliban in Afghanistan enjoyed the support of the ISI. 
Despite Islamabad’s protestations to the contrary, Mullah Omar’s shura was based in the 
Pakistani city of Quetta. Taliban fighters were able to come and go across the border with 
impunity, sometimes even with the complicity of the Pakistani military, to rest and rearm 
themselves. Consecutive American generals warned that for as long as the border remained 
porous, the insurgency could never be contained, let alone defeated. And yet neither Bush nor 
Obama, despite the billions in aid and hardware granted to Islamabad, were ever able to get the 
Pakistanis to plug the dyke.  
 
Most Afghans, certainly their mercurial president, Hamid Karzai, believe the Taliban were not 
just clients but the creation of the ISI. The motive was India, with whom Pakistan has fought 
four disastrous wars since Partition in 1947. According to this thinking, the installation of a 
friendly Pashtun regime in Kabul would offer the Pakistani Army ‘strategic depth,’ that is, an 
impenetrable region in which to withdraw in the event of an Indian land invasion. Hence the 
existence of Directorate S, a department dedicated to the promotion of this over-arching goal - 
and which ultimately, according to Coll’s analysis, proved matchless masters of the long 
double game, who played all the world for fools, and won. 
 
As the emergence of the TTP proved, the strategy carried immense risks. The battle with the 
TTP has cost Pakistan tens of thousands of military dead and wounded, as well as immense 
civilian suffering; and it is not over yet. Moreover, the loyalty of the Afghan Taliban, led by 
proud Pashtun tribesmen with a tradition longer than Islam of fierce independence, has never 
been certain. As they like to say in Afghanistan: ‘When the ISI created the Taliban, they gave 
birth to a tiger. The question is, have they got that tiger by the head or by the tail?’ Ashfaq 
Kayani, the Army Chief from 2007-2013 with whom the US leadership tried so hard to engage, 
and who emerges as a key figure in Coll’s narrative, never resolved that conundrum. By 2012, 
US President Barack Obama was desperate for an honourable exit from the quagmire, and 
asked him to lean on their Taliban clients to come to the negotiating table: negotiation that 
came with the implicit promise of a power-sharing arrangement after the Americans had left. 
Yet Kayani replied that the ISI had ‘contact but not control’ over the Taliban, and that there 
was ‘no way [he] could “deliver” the Taliban to some sort of grand peace bargain.’44  
 
Seven years on from 2012, that peace bargain seems as elusive as ever. The Taliban remain 
rampant. The establishment in 2015 of a branch of ISIS on Afghan soil only added to the 
nation’s volatility.45 In February 2018, President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban peace talks 
‘without preconditions,’ but it is like listening to a scratch on a broken record. A negotiated 
peace has been official Afghan and American policy for a decade now. The violence continues: 
more than 10,000 civilians have been killed or injured every year since US combat operations 
ended in 2014.46 The suicide bombing, meanwhile, is getting worse. More than a hundred 
civilians were killed in January in Kabul, where an explosives-laden ambulance blew up in 
crowds. ‘How are we to live?’ said a shopkeeper, Mohammad Hanif. ‘Where should we go? 
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We have no security. We don’t have a proper government. What should we do?’ The Taliban, 
who claimed that bomb, are unrepentant. “The Islamic emirate has a clear message for Trump 
and his hand-kissers,’ a spokesman said. ‘If you go ahead with a policy of aggression and speak 
from the barrel of a gun, don’t expect Afghans to grow flowers in response.’47  
 
The centrepiece of the US exit strategy was the ANA, the Afghan National Army, a force of 
175,000 that was supposed to provide security for the political process as NATO left. 
Washington has spent over $70 billion on training and funding Afghan security forces, and 
continues to commit over $4 billion per year to that effort.48 Yet this handover strategy didn’t 
work for the Soviets in 1989. Why would it be any different this time? The ‘embedded 
partnership’ between NATO and the ANA was marred early on by a wave of ‘green on blue’ 
killings as Afghans trainees turned their weapons on their Western mentors.49 Perhaps nothing 
is so evocative of the US’s hubristic failure to understand the country it has tried so hard to 
help, nor so illustrative of the limits to American power. At the peak of the phenomenon in 
2012, Coll reveals, 61 Coalition troops were murdered in this way, accounting for an 
astonishing 15 per cent of ISAF fatalities over the year50 - a killing spree, he observes, without 
precedent in modern counterinsurgency. The Pentagon put the blue-on-green killings down to 
‘cultural incompatibility.’ But as a study by the CIA psychiatrist Marc Sageman showed, the 
motivation for changing sides was less often about ideology than about group identification. 
American money was never going to buy true allegiance to a Western-democratized Afghan 
state, any more than it could buy the loyalty of the ISI over the border. Perhaps Rudyard 
Kipling, in his famous poem of 1889, was right after all when he observed, ‘Oh, East is East 
and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’ 51  In any event, the implications for 
American counterterrorism policy are clear. As Marc Sageman concludes, the escalation of 
violent conflict by the US will actually lead to an increase in terrorist activity.52 
 
Is Afghanistan really the irreducible ‘graveyard of empires’ that cynics of Operation Enduring 
Freedom so often claim? Perhaps not. Yet reputations this potent, rooted as Afghanistan’s is in 
a tradition dating back to Alexander the Great, have a way of fulfilling themselves. It certainly 
underpinned the ISI’s dogged pursuit of strategic depth; and America’s military failure there, 
privately predicted from the outset in Islamabad, has only augmented it. The epic sweep of 
Coll’s two volumes is reflected in Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy’s collection of essays, War 
and State-Building in Afghanistan, which seeks to draw lessons from the experiences of 
invaders of the past: the Mughals, the British, and the Soviets.53 Gates and Roy’s comparative 
historical perspectives are introduced with the following rationale (effectively pleading for the 
study of the ‘lessons of history’).  
 
The Mughals, British and Soviets all failed to subjugate Afghanistan. These 
failures offer valuable lessons for today. While military technology has 
changed, the physical geography, social and cultural characteristics have not. 
These unchanging factors limit the extent to which war and state-building 
policies can be modified. This constancy over time makes the experiences of 
the past especially relevant for today.54  
 
Roy himself argues convincingly argue for the very real achievements of the Mughals over two 
centuries (1520-1707). Indeed, they provided many salutary lessons for their successor 
interventionists in Afghanistan.55 Perhaps the most intriguing contribution in War and State-
Building in Afghanistan is from Ivan Arreguín-Toft, a Professor of International Relations at 
Boston University. He argues that the COIN effort was doomed from the start because 
Afghanistan is an ‘imagined state’ rather than a real one, and therefore lacks the ‘critical mass’ 
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of indigenous citizens desirous of a centrally governed community within it.56Elsewhere in the 
volume, John Ferris, a Professor at the University of Calgary, concludes his impressive piece 
with the observation that the British succeeded in Afghanistan only when three conditions 
coincided. First, when ‘it had something to offer’; second, when it was feared; third, when it 
found sufficient locals to cooperate.57 In his piece Pavel K. Baev, a Professor at the Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo, asserts that a declining Soviet Union had ‘neither the Stalinist 
determination nor the Leninist ingenuity to’ achieve a ‘military solution’ to the problem of 
Afghanistan.58 In sum, the range of historical sources and reflections on counter-insurgency 
experiences, with a special emphasis on geography and terrain ensure that represents a valuable 
contribution to the history of intervention and state-building in Afghanistan from 1520 to 2012. 
Regardless of the era under consideration, all of those who have served in Afghanistan would 
be able to relate to Braithwaite’s passionate chronicle of the experience of the Soviet soldier.  
 
The soldiers who do the actual fighting come home having seen and done 
terrible things which return to haunt them. The stories of heroism and 
comradeship help them to manage their memories and give meaning to what 
they have been through. Some claim that the war years were the best of their 
lives. More say nothing, and go to their graves without even telling their 
nearest and dearest what is was really like.  
 
So it is after all wars. So it was after the Soviet war in Afghanistan.59 
 
Modern Afghanistan, as it is delineated on a map, is a strategic artifice, the creation not of 
Afghan nationalists but of British and Russian diplomats in the nineteenth century who sought 
a buffer state between their spheres of influence. As in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and other global trouble spots, the borders of Afghanistan are porous precisely because 
they are at best notional in the minds of the people who live there. The 1,500-mile Af-Pak 
border, notoriously, was drawn up in 1896 by the British colonial administrator Sir Mortimer 
Durand, who never bothered to consult the Pashtun tribes who have lived for millennia on 
either side. In 2017, even Hamid Karzai insisted that Afghanistan would ‘never recognise’ the 
Durand Line.60 It is, Arreguín-Toft asserts, futile to try to rebuild a state that not even its West-
appointed leader appeared to want. Rather than assuming that the International Community’s 
job is ‘to try put Humpty together again’, Arreguín-Toft argues, we should be asking a better 
set of questions: ‘What are the relative costs and benefits of rebuilding an Afghan state? Might 
there be a better (or at least less costly) way to preserve our citizens from terror… than a 
punitive, preventive or pre-emptive military intervention?’61 One solution, he writes, is to 
create the conditions that lead to indigenous demand for a unitary state. In Afghanistan’s case 
that might mean redrawing the maps entirely, abolishing the Durand Line, perhaps even 
creating a new ethnic entity called Pashtunistan. But such an entity would in many places 
stretch as far into Pakistan as the River Indus, a territorial concession that no government in 
Islamabad could possibly contemplate. 
 
Given the futility of the Afghan nation-building project, Arreguín-Toft opines that the vast 
sums the US has spent on trying to secure the country - some $2 trillion since 200162 - might 
more usefully have been spent on improving homeland security. Yet, as he also acknowledges, 
such a course of action would have potentially huge consequences. ‘If the Taliban and their 
allies again take over Afghanistan,’ he writes, ‘it is possible that far from continuing to use 
Pakistan as a base area from which to manipulate Afghan politics, Afghanistan may become a 
base area for manipulating Pakistani politics. Given that Pakistan is known to possess nuclear 
weapons, this is a significant risk of ISAFs departure.’63 Is it a risk that tomorrow’s empires - 
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India, say, or China - will willingly countenance? As a correspondent in 1998, one of the current 
authors was in Peshawar on the day the Islamabad government announced its first nuclear 
weapons, and was left in no doubt of the dangers this development posed.64 There was wild 
jubilation in the streets; a snap newspaper poll found that 80 per cent of Pakistanis favoured a 
nuclear first strike against India in the event of a conventional land invasion from there. Whilst 
there is a great deal of the Afghan future that remains uncertain, Operation Enduring Freedom 
seems unlikely to be the last foreign intervention in this crucible of the world. 
 
James Fergusson 




R. Gerald Hughes 




James Fergusson is an award-winning author and foreign correspondent, specializing in 
Islamic affairs. His book on NATO’s campaign in southern Afghanistan, A Million Bullets 
(2008), was the British Army’s Military Book of the Year. A follow-up book, Taliban (2010), 
reappraised NATO’s notorious enemy and argued the case for renewed Western dialogue with 
them. The World’s Most Dangerous Place (2013), about Somalia, was short-listed for the 
Orwell Prize. His latest book, Al-Britannia, My Country (2017), which argues for a new 
approach to Britain’s growing Muslim community, was described by former Archbishop of 
Canterbury Rowan Williams as ‘a seriously necessary book.’  
 
R. Gerald Hughes is Reader in Military History and Director of the Centre for Intelligence 
and International Security Studies at Aberystwyth University. Hughes is the reviews editor of 
Intelligence & National Security, the world’s leading journal on the role of intelligence in 
international affairs, and is the former editor of the UK Study Group on Intelligence newsletter. 
His publications include Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 
1949-1967 (2007); The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 
(2014); and, as editor, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal (2016); and Exploring 
Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State (2008). R. Gerald Hughes is a member 
of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) and a Fellow of the 
Royal Historical Society (FRHistS). 
 
References 
 Samina Ahmed, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear 
Choices’, International Security, 23/4 (1999): 178-204.  
 David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting 
Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
 Matthew Bevis, ‘Fighting Talk: Victorian War Poetry’ in Tim Kendall (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of British and Irish War Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 7-33. 
 Sir Rodric Braithwaite, interview of 28 January 1998. Churchill College Cambridge: 
British Diplomatic Oral History Programme. 
 Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989 (London: 
Profile Books, 2012). 
10 | P a g e  
 
 Artyom Borovik, Hidden War: A Russian Journalist’s Account of the Soviet War in 
Afghanistan (New York: Grove Press, 1990).  
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 
1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983). 
 Zbigniew Brzezinski (interview), ‘The CIA’s Intervention in Afghanistan’, Le Nouvel 
Observateur (Paris), 15-21 January 1998. 
 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, 
from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York/ London: Penguin, 2005). 
 Steve Coll, ‘Don’t Look Back’, The New Yorker, 1 March 2010. 
 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, 2001-2016 (London: Penguin, 2019). 
 Peter Cooper, ‘The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, 1979-1989’ in Helmut R. 
Hammerich, Uwe Hartmann and Claus von Rosen (eds), Jahrbuch Innere Führung 
2010: Die Grenzen des Militärischen (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles – Verlag, 2010), 
pp. 174-200.                                                                                       
 Diego Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
 DoD News, Defense Media Activity, ‘Obama, Hagel mark end of Operation Enduring 
Freedom’, 28 December 2014. U.S. Department of Defense, 
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603860/obama-hagel-mark-end-of-
operation-enduring-freedom/ (accessed 7 January 2019). 
 John Ehrman, review of Haslam’s Near and Distant Neighbors in Studies in 
Intelligence, 60(1) (2016), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-60-no-1/near-and-
distantneighbors.html (accessed 24 August 2018). 
 James Fergusson, A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the War in Afghanistan (London: 
Bantam Press, 2008). 
 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from 
Nixon to Reagan (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, new ed. 1994). 
 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents 
and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).  
 Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy (eds), War and State-Building in Afghanistan: Historical 
and Modern Perspectives (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). 
 Selig Harrison and William L. Harwood, ‘The Murder of Adolph Dubs’, New York 
Times, 28 December 2001. 
 Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the 
Wall (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).  
 Jonathan Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence 
(New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015). 
 R. Gerald Hughes and Arne Kislenko, ‘‘Fear Has Large Eyes’: The History of 
Intelligence in the Soviet Union’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30/4 (2017): 639-
653. 
 Edward Ingram, In Defence of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, 1775-
1842 (London: Frank Cass, 1984). 
 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Whose Army? Afghanistan’s Future and the Blueprint for Civil 
War (Sanford, NC: Algora, 2014). 
 Christian Friedrich Ostermann, ’New evidence on the war in Afghanistan: 
Introduction’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 14/15 (2003-4), 
pp. 139-41. 
11 | P a g e  
 
 Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, ‘Pak-Afghan Relations: The Durand Line Issue’, Policy 
Perspectives, 5/2 (2008): 87-102. 
 Reuters (Kabul), ‘We have no security’: Kabul reels from deadly ambulance bombing’, 
The Guardian (London), 28 January 2018. 
 Bill Roggio & Lisa Lundquist, ‘Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan: The Data’, 
FDD’s Long War Journal,  
21 March 2017. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/03/21/green-on-
blue_attacks_in_afghanistan_the_data_111015.html (accessed 8 August 2018). 
 Kaushik Roy, War and Society in Afghanistan: From the Mughals to the Americans, 1500-2013 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 Douglas S. Russell, Winston Churchill: Soldier: The Military Life of a Gentleman at 
War, foreword by Sir Martin Gilbert (London: Conway, 2005). 
 Jeanne Sahadi, ‘The financial cost of 16 years in Afghanistan’, CNN Money. 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/21/news/economy/war-costs-afghanistan/index.html 
(accessed 8 August 2018). 
 Svetlana Savranskaya (ed.), ‘The September 11th Sourcebooks: Volume II: 
Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last war: The Soviet experience in Afghanistan: 
Russian Document and Memoirs’. The National Security Archives, 9 October 2001. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html (accessed 12 
December 2018). 
 Naveed Siddiqui, ‘Afghanistan will never recognise the Durand Line: Hamid 
Karzai’, Dawn (Karachi), 5 March 2017. 
 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Reconstructing 
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience 
in Afghanistan (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2017). 
 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Annual Report 2018, 
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_a
nnual_report_2017_final_6_march.pdf (accessed 8 August 2018). 
 Matt Waldman, The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and 
Afghan Insurgents, Crisis States working papers series 2/18 (London: Crisis States 
Research Centre, LSE, 2010). 
 Richard Ware, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, 
Afghanistan, Research Paper 97/41, 25 March 1997. 
 Odd Arne Westad, ‘Concerning the Situation in ‘A:’ New Russian Evidence on the 
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 
8/9 (1996/7): 128-132. 
 Richard Winefield, Never the twain shall meet: Bell, Gallaudet, and the 
communications debate (Washington DC: Gallaudet University Press, 1987). 
 
Endnotes 
1 Matthew Bevis, ‘Fighting Talk: Victorian War Poetry’ in Tim Kendall (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British 
and Irish War Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 27.  
2 Churchill, letter to his mother, 1898. Quoted in Douglas S. Russell, Winston Churchill: Soldier: The Military 
Life of a Gentleman at War, foreword by Sir Martin Gilbert (London: Conway, 2005), p. 177. 
3 A moniker that remains popular. See, for example, Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in 
Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010). 
4  The British Museum, ‘Afghanistan: Crossroads of the Ancient World’, 3 March-3 July 2011. 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2010/afghanistan_exhibition.aspx 
(accessed 10 August 2018). ‘The geographical position, overland connections and history ensured that it [i.e. the 
                                                          
12 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
area of modern Afghanistan] was a region which enjoyed close relations with its neighbours in Central Asia, Iran, 
India and China, as well as more distant cultures stretching as far as the Mediterranean.’ 
5 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Whose Army? Afghanistan’s Future and the Blueprint for Civil War (Sanford, NC: Algora, 
2014), p. 11. 
6  Milton Bearden, ‘Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires’, Foreign Affairs, November/ December 2001; 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2001-11-01/afghanistan-graveyard-empires (accessed 11 
January 2011). 
7  Jonathan Steele, ‘Afghan Ghosts: American Myths’, World Affairs Journal (2010), 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/afghan-ghosts-american-myths (accessed 14 January 2019). 
8 Kaushik Roy, War and Society in Afghanistan: From the Mughals to the Americans, 1500-2013 (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 263. 
9 Edward Ingram, In Defence of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, 1775-1842 (London: Frank Cass, 
1984), pp. 7-19. 
10 The (NATO) International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan was established by the United Nations 
Security Council in December 2001 by Resolution 1386. Richards commanded ISAF from May 2006 until 
February 2007. On NATO, ISAF and Afghanistan, see David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in 
Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
11 James Fergusson, A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the War in Afghanistan (London: Bantam Press, 2008), 
p. 3. 
12 Richard Ware, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, Afghanistan, Research 
Paper 97/41, 25 March 1997, p. 4. 
13 William Dalrymple, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). 
14 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e dimūkrātĩk-e khalq-e Afghānistān). 
15  Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan 
(Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, new ed. 1994), p. 986. 
16 Selig Harrison and Diego Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 34-5; William L. Harwood, ‘The Murder of Adolph Dubs’, New York Times, 
28 December 2001. 
17 Odd Arne Westad, ‘Concerning the Situation in ‘A:’ New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in 
Afghanistan’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 8/9 (1996/7), pp. 128-32. 
18  Christian Friedrich Ostermann, ’New evidence on the war in Afghanistan: Introduction’, Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin, 14/15 (2003-4), pp. 139-41. 
19 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 1046. Amin, having ordered the execution of Taraki, was General 
Secretary of the PDPA between September and December 1979. He was then murdered by the Soviets when they 
invaded in Operation Storm-333 on 27 December 1979. Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in 
Afghanistan, 1979-1989 (London: Profile Books, 2012), p. 94. 
20 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion 
to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 50. 
21 Fergusson, A Million Bullets, p. 254. 
22 As recalled by Robert Gates (Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 1986-9) in his memoirs. Robert M. Gates, 
From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 143-49. 
23 Zbigniew Brzezinski interview, ‘The CIA’s Intervention in Afghanistan’, Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris), 15-
21 January 1998. 
24 See, for example, Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 319; and Jonathan Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors: A 
New History of Soviet Intelligence (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), p. 245.  
25 R. Gerald Hughes and Arne Kislenko, ‘‘Fear Has Large Eyes’: The History of Intelligence in the Soviet Union’, 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30/4 (2017), p. 650.  
26  Ehrman, review of Haslam’s Near and Distant Neighbors in Studies in Intelligence, 60(1) (2016), 
https://www.cia.gov/ library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-60-no-
1/near-and-distantneighbors.html (accessed 24 August 2018). John Ehrman is an analyst in the CIA’s Directorate 
of Analysis. 
27 Artyom Borovik, Hidden War: A Russian Journalist’s Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York: 
Grove Press, 1990), p. 4.  
28 Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 50-1. Quote at 51. 
29 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), p. 429. 
30 Since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, for the last year of his tenure in Moscow he was ambassador to the 
Russian Federation.  
13 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
31 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, p. 327. 
32 Svetlana Savranskaya (ed.), ‘The September 11th Sourcebooks: Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last 
war: The Soviet experience in Afghanistan: Russian Document and Memoirs’. The National Security Archives, 9 
October 2001. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html (accessed 12 December 2018). 
33 Sherard Cowper-Coles, review of Rodric Braithwaite, Afgansty: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989, The 
Guardian (London), 20 March 2011. 
34 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, p. 11.  
35 In 2010 Jonathan Steele wrote that while the Stingers forced Soviet aircraft to operate at higher altitudes (and 
with less accuracy) the hit ratio of the US-supplied missiles was questionable. One US government report 
estimated that approximately ‘one thousand Soviet and Afghan aircraft were destroyed by the end of 1986, mainly 
by Chinese heavy machine guns and other less sophisticated antiaircraft weaponry, whereas during 1987, when 
Stingers were widely used, Soviet and Afghan aircraft losses did not exceed two hundred.’ Steele, ‘Afghan 
Ghosts’.   
36 Peter Cooper, ‘The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, 1979-1989’ in Helmut R. Hammerich, Uwe Hartmann 
and Claus von Rosen (eds), Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2010: Die Grenzen des Militärischen (Berlin: Carola 
Hartmann Miles – Verlag, 2010), p. 195.                                                                                       
37 As suggested by, for example, Kaushik Roy in his War and Society in Afghanistan, p. 169. 
38 Sir Rodric Braithwaite, interview of 28 January 1998. Churchill College Cambridge: British Diplomatic Oral 
History Programme, p. 23. Braithwaite recalled that, in the late 1970s/early 1980s, as Thatcher and Reagan came 
to power, he viewed ‘the Soviet menace [as being] very exaggerated’.  
39 Ware, Afghanistan, p. 27. 
40 In 1993 bin Laden told the British journalist Robert Fisk, in an interview conducted in Alamtig in the Sudan, 
that ‘Personally neither I nor my brothers saw evidence of American help [in Afghanistan]. When my mujahedin 
were victorious and the Russians were driven out’. Robert Fisk, ‘Anti-Soviet warrior puts his army on the road to 
peace: the Saudi businessman who recruited Mujahedin now uses them for large-scale building projects in Sudan’, 
The Independent (London), 6 December 1993. 
41 Cooper, ‘The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, 1979-1989’, p. 178. 
42 President Barack Obama announced the end of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan on 28 December 
2014. Operations in Afghanistan by US forces were then conducted as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. DoD 
News, Defense Media Activity, ‘Obama, Hagel mark end of Operation Enduring Freedom’, 28 December 2014. 
U.S. Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603860/obama-hagel-mark-end-of-
operation-enduring-freedom/ (accessed 7 January 2019). 
43 On this, see Steve Coll, ‘Don’t Look Back’, The New Yorker, 1 March 2010; and Matt Waldman, The Sun in 
the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents, Crisis States working papers series 2/18 
(London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2010). 
44 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2016 
(London: Penguin, 2019), p. 560. 
45 Max Metzger, ‘ISIS have made their move into Afghanistan says army general’, Newsweek, 13 January 2015. 
46 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict – Annual Report 2018 
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2017_final_
6_march.pdf (accessed 8 August 2018). 
47  Reuters (Kabul), ‘‘We have no security’: Kabul reels from deadly ambulance bombing’, The Guardian 
(London), 28 January 2018. 
48 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Reconstructing the Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2017). 
49 Between 1 January 2008 and 17 June 2017 the total number of coalition deaths from green-on-blue attacks was 
152 killed and a further 200 wounded. On this, see Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, ‘Green-on-Blue Attacks in 
Afghanistan: The Data’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 17 June 2017. 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php (accessed 7 January 2019).   
50 On this, see Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, ‘Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan: The Data’, FDD’s Long 
War Journal, 21 March 2017. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/03/21/green-on-
blue_attacks_in_afghanistan_the_data_111015.html (accessed 8 August 2018). 
51 Rudyard Kipling, ‘The Ballad of East and West’, 1889. Quoted in Richard Winefield, Never the twain shall 
meet: Bell, Gallaudet, and the communications debate (Washington DC: Gallaudet University Press, 1987), p. v. 
52 For Marc Sageman’s thinking, see his Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
53 The essays in this volume comprise the following pieces: ‘The Unchanging Nature of Asymmetric Warfare’ 
by Marianne Dahl (Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway), Håvard Mokleiv Nygård (Peace Research Institute 
Oslo, Norway), Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy; ‘Great Mughals, Warfare and COIN in Afghanistan: 1520-1707’ 
14 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
by  Kaushik Roy; ‘Counter-Insurgency and Empire: The British Experience with Afghanistan and the North-
West Frontier, 1838-1947’ by John Ferris (University of Calgary, Canada); ‘How Afghanistan Was Broken: The 
Disaster of the Soviet Intervention’ by Pavel K. Baev (Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute 
Oslo, Norway); ‘Mujahidin vs. Communists: Analysing the Mujahidin’s war strategies after Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan’ by Anne Stenersen (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment); and ‘Explaining NATO’s 
limitations and the Taliban’s Resilience’ by Abdulkader H. Sinno (Indiana University, Bloomington, USA); 
‘Regional Dimensions’ by Kristian Harpviken (Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway); ‘The Afghan National 
Army and Counter-Insurgency’ by Robert Johnson (University of Oxford, UK); and ‘The Country as a Hole: 
Imagined States and the Failure of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’ by Ivan Arreguín-Toft (Boston University, 
USA). 
54 Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy ‘Introduction: Armies, Warfare and the State in Afghanistan from Pre-modern 
Times to the Present Era’ in Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy (eds), War and State-Building in Afghanistan: 
Historical and Modern Perspectives (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 1.  
55 Roy, ‘Great Mughals, Warfare and COIN in Afghanistan’, pp. 72-3. 
56 Arreguín-Toft, ‘The Country as a Hole’, pp. 221-2.  
57 Ferris, ‘‘Counter-Insurgency and Empire’, p. 106. 
58 Baev, ‘‘How Afghanistan Was Broken’, p. 126. 
59 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, p. 336. 
60 Naveed Siddiqui, ‘Afghanistan will never recognise the Durand Line: Hamid Karzai’, Dawn (Karachi), 5 
March 2017. On this, see Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, ‘Pak-Afghan Relations: The Durand Line Issue’, Policy 
Perspectives, 5/2 (2008): 87-102. 
61 Arreguín-Toft, ‘The Country as a Hole’, p. 240. 
62  Jeanne Sahadi, ‘The financial cost of 16 years in Afghanistan’, CNN Money. 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/21/news/economy/war-costs-afghanistan/index.html (accessed 8 August 2018).  
63 Arreguín-Toft, ‘The Country as a Hole’, p. 241. 
64 On 28 May 1998, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced: ‘Today we have settled scores with India 
by detonating five nuclear devices of our own. We have paid them back.’ Samina Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices’, International Security, 23/4 (1999), p.195. 
